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PAVLO BLAVATSKYY and GANNA POGREBNA
RISK AVERSION WHEN GAINS ARE LIKELY
AND UNLIKELY: EVIDENCE FROM A NATURAL
EXPERIMENT WITH LARGE STAKES
ABSTRACT. In the television show Deal or No Deal a contestant is
endowed with a sealed box, which potentially contains a large monetary
prize. In the course of the show the contestant learns more information
about the distribution of possible monetary prizes inside her box. Con-
sider two groups of contestants, who learned that the chances of their
boxes containing a large prize are 20% and 80% correspondingly. Con-
testants in both groups receive qualitatively similar price offers for selling
the content of their boxes. If contestants are less risk averse when facing
unlikely gains, the price offer is likely to be more frequently rejected in
the ﬁrst group than in the second group. However, the fraction of rejec-
tions is virtually identical across two groups. Thus, contestants appear to
have identical risk attitudes over (large) gains of low and high probabil-
ity.
KEY WORDS: risk attitude, risk aversion, risk seeking, natural experi-
ment
JEL CLASSIFICATION: C93, D81
1. INTRODUCTION
Empirical studies ﬁnd that individuals tend to exhibit a
risk-seeking behavior when dealing with risky lotteries that
yield positive outcomes with small probability. At the same
time, individuals often exhibit risk aversion when faced with
lotteries that deliver positive outcomes with moderate or high
probability. Historically, one of the ﬁrst observations in sup-
port of this phenomenon was empirical evidence that people
simultaneously purchase insurance and public lottery tickets
(e.g., Friedman and Savage, 1948). Studies of betting behavior
in horse races (e.g., McGlothlin, 1956; Mukhtar, 1977;
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Williams and Paton, 1997) also document that individual risk
attitudes depend on the nature of risky alternatives. Speciﬁ-
cally, the evidence from gambling in horse races suggests that
individuals tend to undervalue horses, listed as favorites, and
bet on long shots.
The general tendency to prefer less risky alternatives when
dealing with probable gains and more risky alternatives when
dealing with unlikely gains is reﬂected in well-known experi-
mental ﬁndings of the common consequence effect (e.g., the
Allais paradox, Allais, 1953) and the common ratio effect
(e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Numerous experimen-
tal studies documented risk-seeking behavior over gains of
low probability and risk aversion over gains of medium and
high probability. For example, Cohen et al. (1985) ﬁnd that
75% (56%) of subjects are risk seeking, i.e., they prefer a
lottery yielding a gain with probability 1/6 (1/4) over its
expected value for certain. Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
show that subjects reveal a higher certainty equivalent than
the expected value of a lottery in 78% of cases when prob-
ability of a gain is less than 10% and only in 10% of
cases when probability of a gain is higher than 50%. Di
Mauro and Mafﬁoletti (2004) demonstrate that in the auc-
tion setting subjects exhibit risk-seeking behavior when they
face a lottery with 3% and 20% probability of a gain,
and risk averse behavior when probability of a gain is 50%
and 80%.
Studies of risk aversion with large outcomes of low and
high probability rely only on hypothetical incentives. Hershey
and Schoemaker (1980) ﬁnd that subjects tend to choose a
risky lottery over its expected value when the lottery yields
small gain with low probability. However, when a hypothetical
gain is large, subjects tend to be risk averse irrespective of
whether the probability of a gain is low or high.1 Using
a large representative sample of 3,949 Dutch respondents,
Donkers et al. (2001) ﬁnd that individuals exhibit lower
risk aversion when they face large hypothetical gains of low
probability.2
RISK AVERSION WHEN GAINS ARE LIKELY AND UNLIKELY 397
In this article, we use the natural laboratory of the Italian
(Affari Tuoi3) and the British (Deal or No Deal UK) ver-
sions of the television show Deal or No Deal with high mon-
etary incentives to compare risk attitudes when contestants
face lotteries with high and low probability of a gain. Initially
produced in the Netherlands by the media company Endemol,
Deal or No Deal has been later exported to 32 countries
worldwide. In Deal or No Deal a contestant is assigned a
sealed box containing an unknown monetary prize. This prize
ranges from C0.01 to C500,000 in Affari Tuoi and from £0.01
to £250,000 in Deal or No Deal UK. In the course of the
show, the contestant receives more information about the dis-
tribution of possible monetary prizes inside her box and has
an opportunity to sell or exchange her box.
We select two groups of contestants—those, who learned
that there is a 20% probability of having a large prize
inside their boxes, and those, who learned that the cor-
responding probability is 80%. Contestants in both groups
receive qualitatively similar monetary offers for selling the
content of their boxes. If Deal or No Deal contestants are
indeed less risk averse when facing low-probability gains, con-
testants from the ﬁrst group should reject such offers signiﬁ-
cantly more often than contestants from the second group.
However, we ﬁnd that the fraction of contestants who reject
the price offer is virtually identical in both groups. This sug-
gests that contestants have identical risk attitudes irrespective
of whether lotteries yield positive outcomes with low or high
probability.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents an overview of the existing natural experiments
in the television shows. Section 3 describes the rules of the
television shows Affari Tuoi and Deal or No Deal UK. Section
4 provides basic statistical analysis of the recorded sample
of television episodes. Section 5 presents our between-subject
design. Section 6 summarizes the results of the natural exper-
iment. Section 7 concludes.
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2. NATURAL EXPERIMENTS IN TELEVISION SHOWS
Natural experiments, provided by television shows, are often
used in economic research to draw conclusions about vari-
ous aspects of human behavior. Television shows provide an
appealing material for economists, because these shows are
often structured as strategic games and well-deﬁned decision
problems (Metrick, 1995). For example, Bennett and Hickman
(1993) and Berk et al. (1996) employ the natural laboratory of
The Price is Right to test for the optimal information updat-
ing and rational bidding strategies correspondingly. Levitt
(2004) and Antonovics et al. (2005) examine discrimination in
The Weakest Link.
Several studies elicit individual risk attitudes using the
data, obtained from the natural experiments. Particularly,
Gertner (1993), Metrick (1995), and Beetsma and Schot-
man (2001) measure individual risk attitudes in the television
shows Card Sharks, Jeopardy!, and Lingo, respectively. Due
to its simple design and high monetary incentives, Deal or
No Deal television show has attracted economic researchers as
a perfect laboratory for studying individual decision making
under risk.
Post et al. (2004) analyze the decisions of contestants in the
Belgian, Dutch, and German version of Deal or No Deal tele-
vision show. They assume that all contestants have constant
relative risk aversion utility function and either zero wealth
or an ad hoc wealth of C250,000. Post et al. (2004) also esti-
mate a parametric form of cumulative prospect theory with
so-called Quiggin’s probability weighting function and an ad
hoc reference point (either zero, or current monetary offer, or
the highest offer).
Post et al. (2004) ﬁnd that the Arrow–Pratt coefﬁcient of
relative risk aversion (estimated for every contestant) sharply
decreases after a contestant learns that her box does not con-
tain large prize(s). Since such unlucky contestants are likely to
end up facing a gain with small probability, this ﬁnding may
be interpreted as an indirect evidence of contestants being less
risk averse when facing low-probability gains. However, Post
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et al. (2004) ﬁnd that contestants typically face similar dis-
tribution of monetary prizes in their recorded sample. Thus,
direct testing of whether Belgian, Dutch, or German contes-
tants overvalue (undervalue) the gains of low (high) probabil-
ity does not seem to be feasible.
Bombardini and Trebbi (2005) analyze the decisions of
contestants in Affari Tuoi television show. They assume that
all contestants have constant relative risk aversion and use
instrumental variables to estimate the wealth of every contes-
tant based on their profession and place of residence. Bom-
bardini and Trebbi (2005) also estimate a parametric form
of (original) prospect theory without editing phase using
power probability weighting function and a zero reference
point. They ﬁnd that contestants are close to risk neutral-
ity, when lotteries involve small outcomes, and that contes-
tants are generally risk averse, when lotteries involve large
outcomes.
Using several unique features of the show, Mulino et
al. (2006) and De Roos and Saraﬁdis (2006) measure risk
attitudes and study the endowment effect in the Australian
version of Deal or No Deal. Deck et al. (2006) elicit risk
preferences of Deal or No Deal contestants using the natu-
ral laboratory of the Mexican version of the television show
(Vas o No Vas). Botti et al. (2006) analyze risk attitudes in
Affari Tuoi under different theoretical speciﬁcations, partic-
ularly concentrating on the unobserved heterogeneity of the
Italian contestants. Blavatskyy and Pogrebna (2006) analyze
exchange offers in Affari Tuoi and ﬁnd that contestants do
not appear to be predominantly loss averse when facing lot-
teries with large outcomes.
Studies on various versions of Deal or No Deal men-
tioned above, with the exception of Blavatskyy and Pogrebna
(2006), conduct a parametric estimation of expected utility
theory or one of its generalizations. In contrast, this article
follows a non-parametric approach. We study risk aversion
in a between-subject design without assuming that individ-
ual preferences are represented by a speciﬁc decision theory
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with particular functional forms for utility function, probabil-
ity weighting function etc.
3. FORMAT OF THE TELEVISION SHOW
Affari Tuoi and Deal or No Deal UK are versions of the well-
known television show Deal or No Deal, aired 6 days a week
with the exception of Sunday on the national channels of Ital-
ian and British television, respectively. In order to become a
contestant, interested candidates have to apply to the coun-
trywide selection centers. In other words, all contestants self-
select into the show.4
In the Italian version, 20 contestants, representing different
administrative regions of Italy, compete for the opportunity
to play the game in every television episode. Twenty-two con-
testants appear in the British version. All contestants receive
identical boxes, numbered consecutively from the ﬁrst to the
last.
Each box contains a monetary prize ranging from C0.01
to C500,000 in the Italian version (e.g., Figure 1) and from
£0.01 to £250,000 in the British version (e.g., Figure 2).5 In
the Affari Tuoi television show boxes are randomly assigned
and sealed by an independent notary company. In Deal or No
Deal UK prizes are distributed across boxes by an indepen-
dent adjudicator, however, contestants choose their boxes at
random by drawing numbered ping-pong balls.
In both versions of the show contestants know the list of
potential prizes but they do not know the content of each
box. In Affari Tuoi every television episode consists of two
phases: the selection phase and the game itself. During the
selection phase contestants receive one multiple-choice gen-
eral knowledge question. The contestant, who is the ﬁrst to
answer this question correctly, is selected to play the game.
The remaining contestants (waiting contestants) continue to
participate in the next television episode.
The British version of the show does not have a selection
phase. The contestant is pre-selected by the producers and,
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Figure 1. A typical screenshot with a list of possible prizes at the beginning
of the game in Affari Tuoi6.
Figure 2. A typical screenshot with a list of possible prizes at the beginning
of the game in Deal or No Deal UK.
therefore, it is quite rare for contestants to wait for more than
30 shows before they receive an opportunity to play the game.
However, waiting contestants do not know in advance when
they will be selected.
During the game, the contestant keeps her own box and
opens the remaining boxes one by one. Once a box is opened,
the prize sealed inside is publicly revealed and deleted from
the list of possible prizes. The more boxes the contestant
opens, the more information she obtains about the distribu-
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Figure 3. Timing of “bank” offers in Affari Tuoi television episodes before
February 9, 2006 (left chart) and starting from February 9, 2006 (right chart).
tion of possible prizes inside her own box. The goal of the
contestant is to open as many boxes with small prizes as pos-
sible to increase her chances of winning a large prize.
After opening several boxes the contestant receives an offer
from the “bank.” This offer could be either a monetary price
for the content of her box or the possibility to exchange her
box for any of the remaining sealed boxes.7
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Figure 4. Timing of “bank” offers in Deal or No Deal UK television episodes.
Monetary offers are fairly predictable across episodes and
follow a general pattern. In the early stages of the game, they
are smaller than the expected value of possible prizes. As the
game progresses, the gap between the expected value and a
monetary offer decreases and often disappears when there are
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two unopened boxes left. The game terminates when either
the contestant accepts the price offered by the “bank” or
when all boxes are opened. In the former case, the content of
all remaining unopened boxes is revealed. In the latter case,
the contestant leaves with the content of her box, which is
opened last. Figures 3 and 4 show the timing of “bank” offers
in the Italian and the British versions of the show, respec-
tively.
4. BASIC STATISTICS
Data, analyzed in this article, were derived from two sources.
Data on the Italian version of Deal or No Deal were tran-
scribed from original RAI Uno broadcasts of Affari Tuoi
from September 20, 2005 to March 4, 2006. To obtain the
data from the British version of the show we used several
Internet portals with description of the television episodes and
game statistics.8 This information was collected by the view-
ers of Deal or No Deal from Channel 4 broadcasts aired from
October 31, 2005 to September 21, 2006.
The resulting natural laboratory contained 114 Affari Tuoi
episodes and 256 Deal or No Deal UK episodes. Only one
contestant played the game in every episode. In both ver-
sions of the show, the contestant, selected to play the game,
had to decide on at least one monetary offer.9 In the Ital-
ian version of the show the contestant also had to decide on
at least one exchange offer. We recorded the distribution of
all possible prizes that a contestant could potentially win at
the moment when she made each decision as well as the prize
sealed inside her own box (which was revealed only at the end
of the show).
In the beginning of a television episode in both versions
of the show, the contestant, selected to play the game, states
her name, place of current residence, marital status and, less
often, age and occupation. Some personal characteristics of
the contestants in Affari Tuoi and Deal or No Deal UK are
brieﬂy summarized in Table I
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TABLE I
Personal Characteristics of Affari Tuoi and Deal or No Deal UK
contestants
Personal characteristic Affari Tuoi Deal or No Deal UK
(114 contestants) (256 contestants)
Male 52 (45.6%) 129 (50.4%)
Female 62 (54.4%) 127 (49.6%)
Married 90 (78.9%) 55 (50.9%)a
Single 16 (14.0%) 52 (48.1%)a
Divorced 6 (5.3%) 0 (0.0%)a
Widowed 2 (1.8%) 1 (0.9%)a
Minimum reported age 23 20b
Maximum reported age 70 83b
Average age 46.3 43.9b
a Marital status data for Deal or No Deal UK were available for
108 contestants (42.2%).
b Age data for Deal or No Deal UK were collected for 196 contes-
tants (76.6%).
According to their self-reported data, contestants greatly
varied in their age in both versions of the show. However,
average age of contestants in Affari Tuoi was higher than that
of contestants in Deal or No Deal UK. In terms of the gender
composition, the share of female contestants was greater than
that of male contestants in Affari Tuoi sample, while in Deal
or No Deal UK data set men were selected to play the game
more often than women. The majority of contestants in both
versions of the show were married.
In our Affari Tuoi data set, representatives of every Ital-
ian region played the game at least once. Contestants from
Lombardia played the game most frequently (10 times), while
a contestant from Campania played the game only once. In
Deal or No Deal UK, representatives of 22 administrative
regions of the United Kingdom appeared on the show in
the “hot seat”. Contestants from Yorkshire played the game
most often—eight times (we collected data on administrative
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Figure 5. Distribution of ﬁnal earnings across 114 episodes in Affari Tuoi.
regions for 23% of contestants, who played the game in the
British version of the show).
Therefore, the demographics, age and personal character-
istics of Affari Tuoi and Deal or No Deal UK contestants
make them a more representative subject pool than standard
pools, composed primarily of undergraduate students. More-
over, obtaining a similar data set in conventional laboratory
conditions would be a highly ambitious project, since it would
require a total budget of approximately 9 million euros (e.g.,
Table II).
Potentially, in Affari Tuoi and in Deal or No Deal UK
any contestant, selected to play the game, can earn a maxi-
mum prize of C500,000 and £250,000, respectively. However,
the actual earnings of contestants in both versions were sig-
niﬁcantly lower than the maximum (e.g., Table II). Figures 5
and 6 depict the distribution of ﬁnal earnings in Affari Tuoi
and Deal or No Deal UK correspondingly.
Table II provides some statistics on earnings of contestants
in both versions of the show. Both in Affari Tuoi and in Deal
or No Deal UK men earned on average more money than
women. However, irrespective of the gender, average earnings
in both versions of the show were signiﬁcantly lower than the
ex ante expected value of the prizes from Fig. 1 (C52,295) and
Fig. 2 (£25,712) correspondingly.
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TABLE II
Summary statistics on earnings of contestants in Affari Tuoi and Deal or
No Deal UK
Category Affari Tuoi (114
episodes)
Deal or No
Deal UK (256
episodes)
Total money paid out by the
“bank” to contestants
C3,364,852 £4,102,953
Maximum actual earnings C250,000 £120,000
Minimum actual earnings C0.01 £0.01
Average earnings for all contes-
tants
C29,516 £16,027
Median earnings for all contes-
tants
C19,000 £12,200
Standard deviation of earnings
for all contestants
C42,120 £16,605
Average earnings for male con-
testants
C31,582 £16,090
Median earnings for male con-
testants
C20,000 £12,000
Standard deviation of earnings
for male contestants
C48,271 £16,868
Average earnings for female
contestants
C27,784 £15,963
Median earnings for female con-
testants
C17,000 £12,900
Standard deviation of earnings
for female contestants
C36,491 £16,400
Average stake in initial box,
assigned to contestant
C41,279 £19,838
Median stake in initial box,
assigned to contestant
C250 £500
Ex ante expected value of the
prizes
C52,295 £25,712
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Figure 6. Distribution of ﬁnal earnings across 256 episodes in Deal or No Deal
UK.
Furthermore, in both versions of the show average earn-
ings were also lower than the average prize in boxes, initially
assigned to contestants who played the game. In both versions
of the show the distribution of initial endowments was not
signiﬁcantly different from a uniform distribution (χ2 = 22.49
and p=0.2605 in Affari Tuoi and χ2 =20.89 and p=0.4656 in
Deal or No Deal UK).
5. NATURAL EXPERIMENT
The main idea of our between-subject design is to identify
two groups of contestants—those who learned that there is a
small chance of a large prize inside their box and those who
learned that this chance is high—and to compare the rejec-
tion rates for “bank” monetary offers across two groups. In
order to select two groups we use the stage of the game when
ﬁve unopened boxes are left and the probability of receiv-
ing each of ﬁve possible prizes is 20%.10 Speciﬁcally, contes-
tants in the ﬁrst group have learned that the chances of a
large prize inside their box are one to ﬁve. Contestants in the
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second group have learned that the corresponding chances are
four to ﬁve.
In conventional laboratory experiments, which test for risk
attitudes across various types of probabilistic distributions,
subjects typically face a lottery with only one positive out-
come of varied probability (e.g., Cohen et al., 1985). In this
natural experiment contestants face lotteries with ﬁve positive
outcomes. Since we manipulate the probability of receiving a
large prize across two groups, we need to provide a deﬁni-
tion of a “large prize” for each version of the show. Figures 1
and 2 offer two natural thresholds for distinguishing between
large and small prizes. In Affari Tuoi C500 is the last “blue”
prize, which appears on the left hand side of the prize table
(e.g., Figure 1). Furthermore, all prizes below C500 are signiﬁ-
cantly (at least 10 times) smaller than all prizes above C500.
In Deal or No Deal UK £750 is the last “blue” prize, which
appears on the left-hand side of the prize table (e.g., Figure
2). Thus, we identify a contestant as a member of the ﬁrst
(second) group if after opening 15 or 17 boxes she learns that
there is a 20% (80%) probability that the prize inside her box
exceeds C500 or £750 respectively.
A natural way to compare risk attitudes across two groups
is to contrast the decisions of their members when they are
offered the expected value of possible prizes for forgoing
the content of their box. However, when ﬁve boxes remain
unopened, “bank” monetary offers in Affari Tuoi are always
below the expected value of possible prizes and “bank” offers
in Deal or No Deal UK are less than actuarially fair in 98.9%
of all cases.11
A precise mechanism of setting “bank” monetary offers is
not revealed in the show regulations. Bombardini and Trebbi
(2005) suggest that offers in Affari Tuoi can be modeled as
informative signals about the prize sealed inside a contestant’s
box that the “bank” sends to the contestant. De Roos and
Saraﬁdis (2006) conduct a regression analysis of “bank” offers
in the Australian version of Deal or No Deal and ﬁnd that
the variability in “bank” offers is largely explained by the
expected value of the remaining prizes but not by the prize
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hidden inside a contestant’s briefcase. Given these different
models of “bank” offers suggested in the literature, we inves-
tigate the determinants of “bank” offers in our recorded sam-
ple.
Table III presents the results of ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression lnO = β0 + β1X1 + . . . + β11X11 + ε of mon-
etary amounts O that the “bank” offered in exchange for
risky lotteries in the Italian and the British versions of the
show. Explanatory variables X1, . . . ,X11 consist of lottery spe-
ciﬁc variables (mean, median, and standard deviation of pos-
sible prizes, number of possible prizes etc.) and socio-demo-
graphic characteristics of the contestants (gender, age, marital
status, and region).
The second and the ﬁfth column of Table III demonstrate
that around 85% of total variability in monetary offers in
Affari Tuoi and around 74% of total variability in monetary
offers in Deal or No Deal UK is explained by the expected
value and the number of possible prizes left. In both ver-
sions of the show the “bank” makes higher offers when the
number of possible prizes decreases, i.e., the game approaches
the end. Regression coefﬁcient on the standard deviation of
possible prizes is also signiﬁcant (the more dispersed are the
prizes, the lower is the offer). However, regression coefﬁcient
of the prize hidden inside a contestant’s box is never statis-
tically signiﬁcant. Thus, there is no information content of
“bank” offers and, therefore, it is impossible for contestants
to deduce the content of their boxes from the monetary offers
that they receive.
Moreover, in both versions of the show contestants in the
ﬁrst group and in the second group receive qualitatively sim-
ilar monetary offers from the “bank”, i.e., the bank does not
systematically offer less attractive prices for contestants in one
of the groups. Table III shows that “bank” offers do not
depend on the probability of receiving a large prize. Con-
testants are allocated across two groups according to their
chances of receiving a large prize, when ﬁve boxes remain
unopened. Thus, the “bank” does not discriminate between
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contestants in the ﬁrst group and contestants in the second
group when making a monetary offer.
6. RESULTS
Affari Tuoi and Deal or No Deal UK contestants are allo-
cated across two groups at random (as a result of pure chance
events). Moreover, at a given stage of the game, the repre-
sentatives of two groups receive qualitatively similar offers
that are highly correlated with the expected value of possible
prizes. This allows us to formulate our testing hypotheses as
follows:
Hypothesis I The fraction of contestants who reject mon-
etary offers from the “bank” is the same in two groups if
there are no systematic differences in risk attitudes across two
groups.
Hypothesis II The fraction of contestants who reject mone-
tary offers from the “bank” is signiﬁcantly higher in the ﬁrst
group if its members are less risk averse than the members of
the second group.
In our Affari Tuoi sample of 114 television episodes, 13
contestants are identiﬁed as the members of the ﬁrst group
and 20 contestants—as the members of the second group. In
the British data set of 256 television episodes, 23 contestants
are classiﬁed as the members of the ﬁrst group and 25 con-
testants—as the members of the second group. Table IV and
V show how many contestants in each group reject/accept a
monetary offer when ﬁve boxes remain unopened. In both
versions of the show, the rejection/acceptance rates are remark-
ably similar across two groups (p-value for Fisher’s exact
probability test is 0.5535 and 0.3490 for Affari Tuoi and
Deal or No Deal UK correspondingly). Therefore, we cannot
reject Hypothesis I that risk attitudes are identical across two
groups. Apparently, Deal or No Deal contestants in Italy and
the UK do not become less risk averse when facing large
gains of small probability.12
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TABLE IV
Rejection/acceptance rates for “bank” monetary offers across two groups
in Affari Tuoi
Group Number (percentage) of contestants who. . .
Reject “bank” offer Accept “bank” offer
First group, prob(Prize> 9 (69.2%) 4 (30.8%)
C500)=1/5
Second group, prob(Prize> 13 (65.0%) 7 (35.0%)
C500)=4/5
TABLE V
Rejection/acceptance rates for “bank” monetary offers across two groups
in Deal or No Deal UK
Group Number (percentage) of contestants who. . .
Reject “bank” offer Accept “bank” offer
First group, prob(Prize> 16 (69.6%) 7 (30.4%)
£750)=1/5
Second group, prob(Prize> 15 (60.0%) 10 (40.0%)
£750)=4/5
The design of Affari Tuoi has slightly changed starting
from February 9, 2006. In the television episodes broadcasted
before this date, a contestant, who rejects a monetary offer
when ﬁve boxes remain unopened, receives the next “bank”
offer after opening three boxes. In the episodes aired start-
ing from February 9, 2006, such contestant receives the next
“bank” offer each time she opens one box (e.g., Figure 3).
Thus, the optional value of rejecting a monetary offer for a
distribution of ﬁve prizes is higher in the episodes starting
from February 9, 2006.
One can argue that contestants, who participated in Affari
Tuoi after the change in design, are more likely to reject
monetary offers, when ﬁve boxes remain unopened. In our
recorded sample, out of 82 contestants, who received a mon-
etary offer for a distribution of ﬁve prizes before February 9,
2006, 51 contestants rejected the offer. Starting from February
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9, 2006, 14 contestants received a monetary offer when ﬁve
boxes remained unopened and 11 of them rejected the offer.
Although the rejection rate increased from 62.2% to 78.6%
after the change in design, this effect does not appear to be
statistically signiﬁcant (p-value for Fisher’s exact probability
test is 0.1908).
In our recorded sample three contestants from the ﬁrst
group and two contestants from the second group have par-
ticipated in Affari Tuoi starting from February 9, 2006. Thus,
if these contestants are indeed more likely to reject the mone-
tary offers for a distribution of ﬁve prizes, this effect may be
expected to be either similar for both groups or reinforcing
the fraction of rejections in the ﬁrst group.
7. CONCLUSION
This article uses the natural laboratory of the Italian and the
British versions of the television show Deal or No Deal to
test if individuals exhibit lower risk aversion when dealing
with risky lotteries that yield (large) gains of low probability.
Such lower risk aversion (and even risk seeking behavior) over
unlikely gains is persistently documented in numerous experi-
mental studies though evidence in the domain of large gains
relies on hypothetical incentives. The natural experiment in
Deal or No Deal offers a unique opportunity to explore this
phenomenon with real incentives (prizes up to half a million
euros) and real people (representatives of the Italian and the
British population, widely dispersed in terms of age and occu-
pation).
Using a between-subject design and a non-parametric
approach, we compare the decisions of two groups of con-
testants on qualitatively similar price offers for a risky lot-
tery that delivers a large outcome with probability 20% in
the ﬁrst group and 80% in the second group. The fraction
of contestants, who reject the monetary offer, is nearly iden-
tical across two groups, contrary to the expectation that it
should be higher in the ﬁrst group. This ﬁnding suggests that
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contestants in the Italian and the British versions of the tele-
vision show Deal or No Deal do not become less risk averse
when facing large gains of small probability.
Our results seem to conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Hershey and
Schoemaker (1980) that individuals are not prone to lower
risk aversion when dealing with large improbable gains (e.g.,
Endnote 1). Thus, a frequently observed phenomenon that
people overvalue risky lotteries delivering a relatively small
positive outcome with low probability does not appear to
hold with risky lotteries yielding a large positive outcome with
low probability. Apparently, individuals reveal identical risk
attitudes when the probability of a large gain is low and
when it is high. This ﬁnding provides indirect support for
the descriptive validity of expected utility theory for decisions
involving lotteries with large outcomes.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We are grateful to Steffen Andersen, Daniela Di Cagno, Anna
Conte, Glenn Harrison, Wolfgang Ko¨hler, Francesco Trebbi,
Peter Wakker and Nathaniel Wilcox for their insightful com-
ments. We also thank participants of research seminars at the
University of Zurich (April 6, 2006), the University of Inns-
bruck (May 4, 2006), the 12th International Conference on
The Foundation and Application of Utility, Risk and Deci-
sion Theory in Rome, Italy (June 24, 2006) and the Eco-
nomic Science Association European Meeting in Nottingham,
United Kingdom (September 9, 2006). We especially thank
Thierry Post, Guido Baltussen and Martijn Van den Assem
for extensive discussions and for their helpful suggestions.
Pavlo Blavatskyy acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the
Fund for Support of Academic Development at the Univer-
sity of Zurich.
RISK AVERSION WHEN GAINS ARE LIKELY AND UNLIKELY 417
NOTES
1. The faction of subjects, who prefer a hypothetical gain of 10,000
USD with probability p (zero otherwise) over its expected value for
sure, remains nearly identical (27–32%) when the value of p is 0.1%,
1%, 10%, 50%, 90%, and 99%.
2. Only 21% of respondents prefer a 50% chance of receiving 2,000
DFL (zero otherwise) to earning 1,000 DFL for sure. At the same
time, 56% of respondents opt for 1% chance of winning 6,000 DFL
over 2% chance of receiving 3,000 DFL. At the time of the ques-
tionnaire, the exchange rate was 1 DFL ≈0.50 USD.
3. In translation from Italian “Your Business,” “Your Affairs.”
4. According to Bombardini and Trebbi (2005), Italian contestants are
selected from the pool of interested candidates based on two crite-
ria: entertaining appearance and income (wealthy candidates are dis-
carded).
5. At the time of the broadcasts the exchange rate was £1=C1.47947.
.6 Prize C5,000 was replaced with prize C30,000 starting from January
30, 2006.
7. Ofﬁcial rules of Affari Tuoi require the “bank” to offer exchange
option at least once in every television episode. Therefore, the ﬁrst
offer that the “bank” makes is always the exchange offer. Before
February 9, 2006, the ﬁrst offer was always made after the contes-
tant opened six boxes. Starting from February 9, 2006, the ﬁrst offer
was made after the contestant opened three boxes. In Deal or No
Deal UK exchange offer is normally made when there are only two
unopened boxes left and the contestant has rejected the last mone-
tary offer.
8. Particularly, a signiﬁcant portion of the data was compiled from
http://donduk.blogspot.com/2006/06/previous-game-reports.html and
related Internet sources. We have also watched several episodes, avail-
able online, including the Hall of Fame editions of the show with
Deal or No Deal UK highlights. We are particularly grateful to Dave
Woollin for collecting show statistics and publishing it on the web
site http://www.screwthebanker.com and to Morten Lau for provid-
ing information on personal characteristics of contestants.
9. In our recorded sample, Affari Tuoi contestants always rejected a
monetary offer when fourteen boxes remained unopened. Only one
Affari Tuoi contestant accepted a monetary offer (C18,000) when
eleven boxes remained unopened (which was his ﬁrst monetary
offer). Ten contestants accepted monetary offer when eight boxes
remained unopened. Thirty four contestants accepted their third
monetary offer (when ﬁve boxes remained unopened). All remaining
contestants received from four to seven monetary offers. In Deal or
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No Deal UK all contestants rejected the ﬁrst two monetary offers,
nine contestants accepted the third monetary offer (when 11 boxes
remained unopened) and the remaining contestants received from
four to seven monetary offers.
10. In the later stage of the game contestants choose between ﬁfty-ﬁfty
gambles and the offer of the “bank,” which does not allow for dis-
tinguishing between contestants who face likely and unlikely gains.
In the earlier stages of the game, there is no sufﬁcient variability in
the data (e.g. Endnote 9)
11. In our Deal or No Deal UK sample of observations, the “bank”
made four more than actuarially fair offers to contestants. Two of
these offers were made when ﬁve boxes remained unopened and the
other two—when two boxes remained unopened.
12. We also checked if this conclusion depends on the threshold of what
constitutes a “large” prize. Remarkably, the rejection rates across two
groups remain nearly identical when the threshold is varied across all
possible values between C5 and C30,000 in Affari Tuoi and between
£1 and £35,000 in Deal or No Deal UK (with p-values for Fisher’s
exact probability test being between 0.1871 and 0.7073). Details of
this analysis are available from authors on request.
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